Market design and motivated human trading behavior in electricity markets

Mark A. Olson, Stephen J. Rassenti, Vernon L. Smith, Mary L. Rigdon, Michael J. Ziegler

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review

14 Scopus citations


This paper is based on a series of controlled experiments in the trading of wholesale electricity that expands substantially the scope of the research program reported previously. The experiments employed cash motivated students and rented computer laboratory facilities of the University of Arizona. The primary objective of these experiments was to compare two alternative institutional arrangements for the trading of electric power. The first employed day-ahead sealed bid trading of energy for all periods in the subsequent day; the second employed simultaneous continuous double auctions for bilateral trading of energy up to the hour before delivery. All trading was executed on a eight-node network with limited transmission capacity. Each node was to be thought of as a control area, with one large wholesale generator company and one large distribution company resident there.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)100
Number of pages1
JournalProceedings of the Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
StatePublished - 1999
EventProceedings of the 1999 32nd Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, HICSS-32 - Maui, HI, USA
Duration: Jan 5 1999Jan 8 1999

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Computer Science


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