Lies in disguise – A theoretical analysis of cheating

Martin Dufwenberg; Martin A. Dufwenberg

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.013

Lies in disguise – A theoretical analysis of cheating

Martin Dufwenberg
, Martin A. Dufwenberg

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

77 Scopus citations

Abstract

We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, referred to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived to cheat. A particular equilibrium, characterized by three intuitive properties, captures the stylized facts from many experiments (in particular the co-presence of selfish, honest, and partial-lie choices) well.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	248-264
Number of pages	17
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	175
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.013
State	Published - May 2018

Keywords

Audience
Cheating
Costs
Lying
Perceived cheating aversion
Psychological game theory

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.013

Cite this

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AB - We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, referred to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived to cheat. A particular equilibrium, characterized by three intuitive properties, captures the stylized facts from many experiments (in particular the co-presence of selfish, honest, and partial-lie choices) well.

KW - Audience

KW - Cheating

KW - Costs

KW - Lying

KW - Perceived cheating aversion

KW - Psychological game theory

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ER -

Lies in disguise – A theoretical analysis of cheating

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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