TY - JOUR
T1 - Lies in disguise – A theoretical analysis of cheating
AU - Dufwenberg, Martin
AU - Dufwenberg, Martin A.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2018/5
Y1 - 2018/5
N2 - We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, referred to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived to cheat. A particular equilibrium, characterized by three intuitive properties, captures the stylized facts from many experiments (in particular the co-presence of selfish, honest, and partial-lie choices) well.
AB - We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, referred to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived to cheat. A particular equilibrium, characterized by three intuitive properties, captures the stylized facts from many experiments (in particular the co-presence of selfish, honest, and partial-lie choices) well.
KW - Audience
KW - Cheating
KW - Costs
KW - Lying
KW - Perceived cheating aversion
KW - Psychological game theory
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.013
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.013
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85044862489
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 175
SP - 248
EP - 264
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
ER -