Legalization and Compliance: How Judicial Activity Undercuts the Global Trade Regime

Jeffrey Kucik, Lauren Peritz, Sergio Puig

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

The crisis facing the World Trade Organization illustrates the trade-off between legalization and compliance in international legal systems. Dispute bodies can sometimes overreach in their rulings, leading to resistance from member states. This article looks at one form of legal overreach: the extension of legal precedent. We argue that extending previous decisions can reduce the flexibility that states include deliberately in their agreements. We utilize original data on individual applications of precedent in the World Trade Organization's Appellate Body decisions from 1995 to 2015 and on policy responses to those decisions. We find strong evidence that extending precedent reduces on-time compliance. It also leads to longer delays before members comply. The results speak to the life cycles of international organizations, as well as questions of design and cooperation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)221-238
Number of pages18
JournalBritish Journal of Political Science
Volume53
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2023

Keywords

  • World Trade Organization
  • dispute settlement
  • international law
  • interstate cooperation
  • legalization

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Political Science and International Relations

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Legalization and Compliance: How Judicial Activity Undercuts the Global Trade Regime'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this