Learning with repeated-game strategies

Christos A. Ioannou, Julian Romero

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We use the self-tuning Experience Weighted Attraction model with repeated-game strategies as a computer testbed to examine the relative frequency, speed of convergence and progression of a set of repeated-game strategies in four symmetric 2 × 2 games: Prisoner's Dilemma, Battle of the Sexes, Stag-Hunt, and Chicken. In the Prisoner's Dilemma game, we find that the strategy with the most occurrences is the "Grim-Trigger." In the Battle of the Sexes game, a cooperative pair that alternates between the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria emerges as the one with the most occurrences. In the Stag-Hunt and Chicken games, the "Win-Stay, Lose-Shift" and "Grim-Trigger" strategies are the ones with the most occurrences. Overall, the pairs that converged quickly ended up at the cooperative outcomes, whereas the ones that were extremely slow to reach convergence ended up at non-cooperative outcomes.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article numberArticle 212
JournalFrontiers in Neuroscience
Issue number8 JUL
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Adaptive models
  • Experience weighted attraction model
  • Finite automata

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Neuroscience

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Learning with repeated-game strategies'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this