Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games

Andreas Blume, Tone Arnold

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

8 Scopus citations


We study learning in communication games. Our main finding is that a simple forward-looking learning rule leads to communication in a large class of games. This class is characterized by a partial-common-interest condition. In contrast, we show that a variety of purely backward looking dynamics may fail to guarantee communication. Memory is a partial substitute for looking forward: With long memory, backward-looking learning leads to communication in a class of games with perfect incentive alignment.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)240-259
Number of pages20
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number2
StatePublished - Feb 2004


  • Cheap talk
  • Communication
  • Evolution
  • Game theory
  • Incentive alignment
  • Information transmission
  • Language
  • Learning
  • Meaning

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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