Abstract
We study learning in communication games. Our main finding is that a simple forward-looking learning rule leads to communication in a large class of games. This class is characterized by a partial-common-interest condition. In contrast, we show that a variety of purely backward looking dynamics may fail to guarantee communication. Memory is a partial substitute for looking forward: With long memory, backward-looking learning leads to communication in a class of games with perfect incentive alignment.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 240-259 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Volume | 46 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Feb 2004 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Cheap talk
- Communication
- Evolution
- Game theory
- Incentive alignment
- Information transmission
- Language
- Learning
- Meaning
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics