Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games

Andreas Blume; Tone Arnold

doi:10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00120-9

Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games

Andreas Blume, Tone Arnold

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study learning in communication games. Our main finding is that a simple forward-looking learning rule leads to communication in a large class of games. This class is characterized by a partial-common-interest condition. In contrast, we show that a variety of purely backward looking dynamics may fail to guarantee communication. Memory is a partial substitute for looking forward: With long memory, backward-looking learning leads to communication in a class of games with perfect incentive alignment.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	240-259
Number of pages	20
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	46
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00120-9
State	Published - Feb 2004

Keywords

Cheap talk
Communication
Evolution
Game theory
Incentive alignment
Information transmission
Language
Learning
Meaning

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00120-9

Cite this

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title = "Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games",

abstract = "We study learning in communication games. Our main finding is that a simple forward-looking learning rule leads to communication in a large class of games. This class is characterized by a partial-common-interest condition. In contrast, we show that a variety of purely backward looking dynamics may fail to guarantee communication. Memory is a partial substitute for looking forward: With long memory, backward-looking learning leads to communication in a class of games with perfect incentive alignment.",

keywords = "Cheap talk, Communication, Evolution, Game theory, Incentive alignment, Information transmission, Language, Learning, Meaning",

author = "Andreas Blume and Tone Arnold",

note = "Funding Information: This paper was begun while both authors enjoyed the hospitality of CentER at Tilburg University. This research was supported by a TMR grant from the European Commission and by the National Science Foundation (award numbers SBR-9410588 and SBR-9808947). We have benefited from comments by seminar audiences at the Midwest Mathematical Economics Meetings and at the Social Science Research Center-Berlin (WZB). We thank, without implicating, Drew Fudenberg, George Mailath and John Nachbar for discussions and comments on an earlier version of this paper.",

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AU - Arnold, Tone

N1 - Funding Information: This paper was begun while both authors enjoyed the hospitality of CentER at Tilburg University. This research was supported by a TMR grant from the European Commission and by the National Science Foundation (award numbers SBR-9410588 and SBR-9808947). We have benefited from comments by seminar audiences at the Midwest Mathematical Economics Meetings and at the Social Science Research Center-Berlin (WZB). We thank, without implicating, Drew Fudenberg, George Mailath and John Nachbar for discussions and comments on an earlier version of this paper.

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N2 - We study learning in communication games. Our main finding is that a simple forward-looking learning rule leads to communication in a large class of games. This class is characterized by a partial-common-interest condition. In contrast, we show that a variety of purely backward looking dynamics may fail to guarantee communication. Memory is a partial substitute for looking forward: With long memory, backward-looking learning leads to communication in a class of games with perfect incentive alignment.

AB - We study learning in communication games. Our main finding is that a simple forward-looking learning rule leads to communication in a large class of games. This class is characterized by a partial-common-interest condition. In contrast, we show that a variety of purely backward looking dynamics may fail to guarantee communication. Memory is a partial substitute for looking forward: With long memory, backward-looking learning leads to communication in a class of games with perfect incentive alignment.

KW - Cheap talk

KW - Communication

KW - Evolution

KW - Game theory

KW - Incentive alignment

KW - Information transmission

KW - Language

KW - Learning

KW - Meaning

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SN - 0899-8256

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Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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