Knowledge, speaker and subject

Stewart Cohen

doi:10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00395.x

Knowledge, speaker and subject

Stewart Cohen

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

27 Scopus citations

Abstract

I contrast two solutions to the lottery paradox concerning knowledge: contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism. I defend contextualism against an objection that it cannot explain how 'knows' and its cognates function inside propositional attitude reports. I then argue that subject-sensitive invariantism fails to provide a satisfactory resolution of the paradox.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	199-212
Number of pages	14
Journal	Philosophical Quarterly
Volume	55
Issue number	219
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00395.x
State	Published - Apr 2005

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Philosophy

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10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00395.x

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Knowledge, speaker and subject

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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