Information disclosure in auctions: An experiment

Martin Dufwenberg, Uri Gneezy

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

60 Scopus citations


We report experimental results on the importance of information disclosure policy in first-price sealed-bid auctions. Interaction takes place in 10 periods according to a random-matching protocol, and we control the level of information feedback bidders receive after each period. When bidders are informed about the losing bids in previous periods, prices are higher than the theoretical prediction. However, when this information is not revealed the bidding becomes more competitive, and the bids come close to the theoretical prediction. We suggest that a signaling phenomenon may be important for explaining these results.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)431-444
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Issue number4
StatePublished - 2002


  • Experiment
  • First-price auctions
  • Information disclosure
  • Signaling

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management


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