Abstract
We report experimental results on the importance of information disclosure policy in first-price sealed-bid auctions. Interaction takes place in 10 periods according to a random-matching protocol, and we control the level of information feedback bidders receive after each period. When bidders are informed about the losing bids in previous periods, prices are higher than the theoretical prediction. However, when this information is not revealed the bidding becomes more competitive, and the bids come close to the theoretical prediction. We suggest that a signaling phenomenon may be important for explaining these results.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 431-444 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization |
Volume | 48 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2002 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Experiment
- First-price auctions
- Information disclosure
- Signaling
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management