TY - JOUR
T1 - Information disclosure in auctions
T2 - An experiment
AU - Dufwenberg, Martin
AU - Gneezy, Uri
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank Gary Charness, Eric van Damme, David Grether, and Reinhard Selten for very helpful comments, and the Swedish Competition Authority for financial support. We started this research while we were both at the CentER for Economic Research at Tilburg University, and completed it during a visit of Uri Gneezy to Stockholm University.
PY - 2002
Y1 - 2002
N2 - We report experimental results on the importance of information disclosure policy in first-price sealed-bid auctions. Interaction takes place in 10 periods according to a random-matching protocol, and we control the level of information feedback bidders receive after each period. When bidders are informed about the losing bids in previous periods, prices are higher than the theoretical prediction. However, when this information is not revealed the bidding becomes more competitive, and the bids come close to the theoretical prediction. We suggest that a signaling phenomenon may be important for explaining these results.
AB - We report experimental results on the importance of information disclosure policy in first-price sealed-bid auctions. Interaction takes place in 10 periods according to a random-matching protocol, and we control the level of information feedback bidders receive after each period. When bidders are informed about the losing bids in previous periods, prices are higher than the theoretical prediction. However, when this information is not revealed the bidding becomes more competitive, and the bids come close to the theoretical prediction. We suggest that a signaling phenomenon may be important for explaining these results.
KW - Experiment
KW - First-price auctions
KW - Information disclosure
KW - Signaling
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U2 - 10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00235-9
DO - 10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00235-9
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0036109506
VL - 48
SP - 431
EP - 444
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
SN - 0167-2681
IS - 4
ER -