Incomplete contracts and competition: Another look at fisher body/general motors?

Antonio Nicita, Simone M. Sepe

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations


In this paper we analyze the problem of the enforcement of incomplete contracts with endogenous outside options. Some of the equilibria we outline may reverse one of the main results presented in the standard literature. We then revisit the literature on the highly debated Fisher Body/General Motors merger and suggest an explanation based on GM's need to control the Fisher brothers' outside options.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)495-514
Number of pages20
JournalEuropean Journal of Law and Economics
Issue number3
StatePublished - Dec 2012


  • Cross competition
  • Endogenous outside options
  • Hold-up problem
  • Incomplete contracts
  • Transaction costs
  • Vertical integration

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Law


Dive into the research topics of 'Incomplete contracts and competition: Another look at fisher body/general motors?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this