Imagination and the I

Shaun Nichols

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.00356.x

Imagination and the I

Shaun Nichols

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

22 Scopus citations

Abstract

Thought experiments about the self seem to lead to deeply conflicting intuitions about the self. Cases imagined from the 3^rd person perspective seem to provoke different responses than cases imagined from the 1^st person perspective. This paper argues that recent cognitive theories of the imagination, coupled with standard views about indexical concepts, help explain our reactions in the 1^st person cases. The explanation helps identify intuitions that should not be trusted as a guide to the metaphysics of the self.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	518-535
Number of pages	18
Journal	Mind and Language
Volume	23
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.00356.x
State	Published - Nov 2008

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Language and Linguistics
Philosophy
Linguistics and Language

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10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.00356.x

Cite this

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Imagination and the I

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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