TY - GEN
T1 - IJam with channel randomization
AU - Melcher, Jordan L.
AU - Zheng, Yao
AU - Anthony, Dylan
AU - Troglia, Matthew
AU - Yang, Thomas
AU - Yang, Alvin
AU - Aggelopoulos, Samson
AU - Pan, Yanjun
AU - Li, Ming
N1 - Funding Information:
This work is partly supported by NSF grants CNS-1948568, DGE-1662487, ARO grant W911NF-19-1-0050, and Naval Information Warfare Center Pacific.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 Owner/Author.
PY - 2020/7/8
Y1 - 2020/7/8
N2 - Physical-layer key generation methods utilize the variations of the communication channel to achieve a secure key agreement between two parties with no prior security association. Their secrecy rate (bit generation rate) depends heavily on the randomness of the channel, which may reduce significantly in a stable environment. Existing methods seek to improve the secrecy rate by injecting artificial noise into the channel. Unfortunately, noise injection cannot alter the underlying channel state, which depends on the multipath environment between the transmitter and receiver. Consequently, these methods are known to leak key bits toward multi-antenna eavesdroppers, which is capable of filtering the noise through the differential of multiple signal receptions. This work demonstrates an improved approach to reinforce physical-layer key generation schemes, e.g., channel randomization. The channel randomization approach leverages a reconfigurable antenna to rapidly change the channel state during transmission, and an angle-of-departure (AoD) based channel estimation algorithm to cancel the changing effects for the intended receiver. The combined result is a communication channel stable in the eyes of the intended receiver but randomly changing from the viewpoint of the eavesdropper. We augmented an existing physical-layer key generation protocol, iJam, with the proposed approach and developed a full-fledged remote instrumentation platform to demonstrate its performance. Our evaluations show that augmentation does not affect the bit error rate (BER) of the intended receiver during key establishment but reduces the eavesdropper's BER to the level of random guessing, regardless of the number of antennas it equips.
AB - Physical-layer key generation methods utilize the variations of the communication channel to achieve a secure key agreement between two parties with no prior security association. Their secrecy rate (bit generation rate) depends heavily on the randomness of the channel, which may reduce significantly in a stable environment. Existing methods seek to improve the secrecy rate by injecting artificial noise into the channel. Unfortunately, noise injection cannot alter the underlying channel state, which depends on the multipath environment between the transmitter and receiver. Consequently, these methods are known to leak key bits toward multi-antenna eavesdroppers, which is capable of filtering the noise through the differential of multiple signal receptions. This work demonstrates an improved approach to reinforce physical-layer key generation schemes, e.g., channel randomization. The channel randomization approach leverages a reconfigurable antenna to rapidly change the channel state during transmission, and an angle-of-departure (AoD) based channel estimation algorithm to cancel the changing effects for the intended receiver. The combined result is a communication channel stable in the eyes of the intended receiver but randomly changing from the viewpoint of the eavesdropper. We augmented an existing physical-layer key generation protocol, iJam, with the proposed approach and developed a full-fledged remote instrumentation platform to demonstrate its performance. Our evaluations show that augmentation does not affect the bit error rate (BER) of the intended receiver during key establishment but reduces the eavesdropper's BER to the level of random guessing, regardless of the number of antennas it equips.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85091984278&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85091984278&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/3395351.3401705
DO - 10.1145/3395351.3401705
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85091984278
T3 - WiSec 2020 - Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
SP - 340
EP - 342
BT - WiSec 2020 - Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
PB - Association for Computing Machinery
T2 - 13th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks, WiSec 2020
Y2 - 8 July 2020 through 10 July 2020
ER -