Abstract
Hybrid goods include both an objective and a subjective component. On the account of hybrid goods presented in this chapter, a component of well-being is subjective if and only if its value is determined by warrantless favoring attitudes. A component of well-being is objective if either it is valuable for one irrespective of one's favoring attitudes toward it or, while a normative role for one's attitudes in grounding prudential value is allowed, this role is restricted to attitudes that are appropriately responsive to the goodness of their object. Hybrid goods so understood have not been subjected to much analysis. This chapter aims to show how understanding them brings into view complexities in how the attitudes of persons affect the value of the goods in their lives, casts light on certain substantive prudential goods such as friendship, and illuminates the nature of rational choice between incommensurably good options.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics |
Subtitle of host publication | Volume 14 |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 117-137 |
Number of pages | 21 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780198930815 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780198930785 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Oct 24 2024 |
Keywords
- Fittingness
- Friendship
- Grass counting
- Hybrid good
- Incommensurability
- Subjective value
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Arts and Humanities