Abstract
Mixed strategies – where one opts to randomize one’s decision – are thought to be of minimal significance in the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma. We argue against this commonsense view. Mixed strategies play a role in the emergence of cooperation and can even stabilize some level of cooperation under conditions where cooperation was previously thought impossible.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 322-329 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| Journal | Analysis (United Kingdom) |
| Volume | 85 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Apr 1 2025 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- cooperation
- evolution
- game theory
- prisoner’s dilemma
- social philosophy
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy
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