How governance under the ‘grand compromise’ affects refugee preferences for relocation: evidence from Syrian refugees in Lebanon

We examine how governance actors in first-asylum countries affect refugees' relocation preferences. We argue that external humanitarian actors and host country actors can have different effects on refugees' aspiration and perceived ability to relocate away from the first-asylum country. Using an original survey of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, we find that when refugees believe external actors are effective at dealing with refugee issues, they are significantly less likely to aspire to migrate but significantly more likely to feel able to do so. When refugees believe the host government is effective at providing security, they are significantly more likely to aspire to relocate but significantly less likely to feel able to do so. In other words, the effectiveness of host actors is associated with ‘involuntary immobility’. To probe this finding further, we rely on a modified conjoint experiment. In line with our observational findings, we find that refugees who believe host actors are effective are more likely to choose relocation over staying when presented with a legal opportunity, indicating involuntary immobility. Refugees who believe external actors are effective are no more likely than others to choose relocation when presented with a legal resettlement opportunity.