Honesty and informal agreements

Martin Dufwenberg, Maroš Servátka, Radovan Vadovič

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

13 Scopus citations


We develop, and experimentally test, models of informal agreements. Agents are assumed to be honest but suffer costs of overcoming temptations. We extend two classical bargaining solutions – split-the-difference and deal-me-out – to this informal agreement setting. For each solution there are two natural ways to do this, leaving us with 2×2 models to explore. In the experiment, a temptations-constrained version of deal-me-out emerges as the clear winner.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)269-285
Number of pages17
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
StatePublished - Mar 1 2017


  • Agreements
  • Communication
  • Experiment
  • Game theory
  • Negotiations
  • Temptation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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