Hide and seek in Arizona

Robert W. Rosenthal; Jason Shachat; Mark Walker

doi:10.1007/s001820300159

Hide and seek in Arizona

Robert W. Rosenthal
, Jason Shachat
, Mark Walker

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

18 Scopus citations

Abstract

Laboratory subjects repeatedly played one of two variations of a simple two-person zero-sum game of "hide and seek". Three puzzling departures from the prescriptions of equilibrium theory are found in the data: an asymmetry related to the player's role in the game; an asymmetry across the game variations; and positive serial correlation in subjects' play. Possible explanations for these departures are considered.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	273-293
Number of pages	21
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	32
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820300159
State	Published - Dec 2003

Keywords

Experiment
Minimax
Mixed strategy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Statistics and Probability
Mathematics (miscellaneous)
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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10.1007/s001820300159

Cite this

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title = "Hide and seek in Arizona",

abstract = "Laboratory subjects repeatedly played one of two variations of a simple two-person zero-sum game of {"}hide and seek{"}. Three puzzling departures from the prescriptions of equilibrium theory are found in the data: an asymmetry related to the player's role in the game; an asymmetry across the game variations; and positive serial correlation in subjects' play. Possible explanations for these departures are considered.",

keywords = "Experiment, Minimax, Mixed strategy",

author = "Rosenthal, \{Robert W.\} and Jason Shachat and Mark Walker",

year = "2003",

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language = "English (US)",

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journal = "International Journal of Game Theory",

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AU - Rosenthal, Robert W.

AU - Shachat, Jason

AU - Walker, Mark

PY - 2003/12

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N2 - Laboratory subjects repeatedly played one of two variations of a simple two-person zero-sum game of "hide and seek". Three puzzling departures from the prescriptions of equilibrium theory are found in the data: an asymmetry related to the player's role in the game; an asymmetry across the game variations; and positive serial correlation in subjects' play. Possible explanations for these departures are considered.

AB - Laboratory subjects repeatedly played one of two variations of a simple two-person zero-sum game of "hide and seek". Three puzzling departures from the prescriptions of equilibrium theory are found in the data: an asymmetry related to the player's role in the game; an asymmetry across the game variations; and positive serial correlation in subjects' play. Possible explanations for these departures are considered.

KW - Experiment

KW - Minimax

KW - Mixed strategy

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0346937575

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0346937575#tab=citedBy

U2 - 10.1007/s001820300159

DO - 10.1007/s001820300159

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0346937575

SN - 0020-7276

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SP - 273

EP - 293

JO - International Journal of Game Theory

JF - International Journal of Game Theory

IS - 2

ER -

Hide and seek in Arizona

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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