TY - GEN
T1 - Game theoretical analysis of coexistence in MIMO-empowered Cognitive Radio Networks
AU - Hou, Yantian
AU - Li, Ming
AU - Yang, Dejun
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was supported in part under grants NSF Grants CNS-1564477, CNS-1619728, and CNS-1420881.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 IEEE.
PY - 2017/3/10
Y1 - 2017/3/10
N2 - In Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs), the spectrum underlay approach enables primary and secondary networks to transmit simultaneously, as long as the interference from the secondary network to the primary network is below certain threshold. As the recent advancement of the underlay approach, the transparent coexistence exploiting MIMO interference cancellation was proposed. Previous works assume that the secondary networks will completely follow the spectrum access rules by restricting their interference towards the primary network. However, this assumption might be invalid in practice due to the selfish nature of CRN users. In this work, we study the multi-hop MIMO-empowered secondary network's incentives of following or violating this rule through compliantly canceling or non-compliantly ignoring its interferences towards the primary network. Specifically, we model the coexistence between the primary and secondary networks as a Stackelberg game. The equilibriums reveal the secondary network's non-compliant incentives. These insights help in developing the methodology to deal with such type of selfish secondary networks.
AB - In Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs), the spectrum underlay approach enables primary and secondary networks to transmit simultaneously, as long as the interference from the secondary network to the primary network is below certain threshold. As the recent advancement of the underlay approach, the transparent coexistence exploiting MIMO interference cancellation was proposed. Previous works assume that the secondary networks will completely follow the spectrum access rules by restricting their interference towards the primary network. However, this assumption might be invalid in practice due to the selfish nature of CRN users. In this work, we study the multi-hop MIMO-empowered secondary network's incentives of following or violating this rule through compliantly canceling or non-compliantly ignoring its interferences towards the primary network. Specifically, we model the coexistence between the primary and secondary networks as a Stackelberg game. The equilibriums reveal the secondary network's non-compliant incentives. These insights help in developing the methodology to deal with such type of selfish secondary networks.
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U2 - 10.1109/ICCNC.2017.7876119
DO - 10.1109/ICCNC.2017.7876119
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85017355377
T3 - 2017 International Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications, ICNC 2017
SP - 155
EP - 161
BT - 2017 International Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications, ICNC 2017
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2017 International Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications, ICNC 2017
Y2 - 26 January 2017 through 29 January 2017
ER -