TY - CHAP
T1 - Game Structures in Mutualistic Interactions
T2 - What Can the Evidence Tell Us About the Kind of Models We Need?
AU - Bshary, Redouan
AU - Bronstein, Judith L.
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank the editors for inviting us to write this article. We particularly thank Jane Brockmann and Marc Naguib for perceptive comments on a previous version. Funding was provided by the University of Liverpool.
PY - 2004
Y1 - 2004
N2 - Currently, there is little information transfer between empiricists working on cooperative interactions between species (mutualism) and theoreticians who model possible scenarios for the evolution and maintenance of cooperation between unrelated individuals. Furthermore, both theoretical and behavioral approaches often fail to consider ecological parameters that influence behavior. Our goal is to present the wealth of empirical knowledge (both behavioral and ecological) on mutualistic systems in a structure that may facilitate communication between empiricists and theoreticians. We have chosen eight broad categories of mutualisms that have been intensely studied and that are relatively well understood. For each system, we assess possible states of 12 parameters that can help theoreticians to construct game structures of mutualisms that are built on current empirical knowledge. We point out how ecological variables may influence behavioral decisions in ways not identified by our parameters. Finally, we elucidate similarities between mutualistic systems with respect to game structures that may not be expected given the diversity of mutualisms with respect to ecological and evolutionary background. On the basis of these results, we promote an interactive approach with models based on empirical knowledge, amenable to further testing.
AB - Currently, there is little information transfer between empiricists working on cooperative interactions between species (mutualism) and theoreticians who model possible scenarios for the evolution and maintenance of cooperation between unrelated individuals. Furthermore, both theoretical and behavioral approaches often fail to consider ecological parameters that influence behavior. Our goal is to present the wealth of empirical knowledge (both behavioral and ecological) on mutualistic systems in a structure that may facilitate communication between empiricists and theoreticians. We have chosen eight broad categories of mutualisms that have been intensely studied and that are relatively well understood. For each system, we assess possible states of 12 parameters that can help theoreticians to construct game structures of mutualisms that are built on current empirical knowledge. We point out how ecological variables may influence behavioral decisions in ways not identified by our parameters. Finally, we elucidate similarities between mutualistic systems with respect to game structures that may not be expected given the diversity of mutualisms with respect to ecological and evolutionary background. On the basis of these results, we promote an interactive approach with models based on empirical knowledge, amenable to further testing.
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U2 - 10.1016/S0065-3454(04)34002-7
DO - 10.1016/S0065-3454(04)34002-7
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:29144513642
SN - 0120045346
SN - 9780120045341
T3 - Advances in the Study of Behavior
SP - 59
EP - 101
BT - Advances in the Study of Behavior
PB - Academic Press Inc.
ER -