TY - JOUR
T1 - Fundamental principles and mechanisms of the conscious self
AU - Samsonovich, Alexei V.
AU - Nadel, Lynn
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgments. We are grateful to Dr. K. De Jong for valuable discussions and to two anonymous referees for their very useful critical comments on an earlier version of the manuscript. The early stage of this research was supported by the Consciousness Studies Research Grant “Artificial Consciousness as a Metaphor for Human Consciousness” to Alexei Samsonovich and Lynn Nadel from the Center for Consciousness Studies at the University of Arizona and the Fetzer Institute, 1999-2000.
PY - 2005/10
Y1 - 2005/10
N2 - We start by assuming that the self is implemented in the brain as a functional unit, with a definite set of properties. We deduce the fundamental properties of the self from an analysis of neurological disorders and from introspection. We formulate a functionalist concept of the self based on these properties reduced to constraints. We use the formalism of schemas in our functionalist analysis, i.e. a symbolic level description of brain dynamics. We then reformulate the functionalist model at a connectionist level and address the emergent "context shifting" problem. We suggest how the model might be mapped onto the functional neuroanatomy of the brain, and how it could be used to give an account of a range of neurological disorders, including hippocampal amnesia, various forms of schizophrenia, multiple personality, autism, PTSD, hemineglect, and reversible anosognosia. Finally, we briefly discuss future perspectives and possible applications of computer implementations of the model.
AB - We start by assuming that the self is implemented in the brain as a functional unit, with a definite set of properties. We deduce the fundamental properties of the self from an analysis of neurological disorders and from introspection. We formulate a functionalist concept of the self based on these properties reduced to constraints. We use the formalism of schemas in our functionalist analysis, i.e. a symbolic level description of brain dynamics. We then reformulate the functionalist model at a connectionist level and address the emergent "context shifting" problem. We suggest how the model might be mapped onto the functional neuroanatomy of the brain, and how it could be used to give an account of a range of neurological disorders, including hippocampal amnesia, various forms of schizophrenia, multiple personality, autism, PTSD, hemineglect, and reversible anosognosia. Finally, we briefly discuss future perspectives and possible applications of computer implementations of the model.
KW - Contextual reinstatement
KW - Episodic memory
KW - Hippocampus
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U2 - 10.1016/S0010-9452(08)70284-3
DO - 10.1016/S0010-9452(08)70284-3
M3 - Article
C2 - 16209330
AN - SCOPUS:17144429011
SN - 0010-9452
VL - 41
SP - 669
EP - 689
JO - Cortex
JF - Cortex
IS - 5
ER -