Abstract
What explains the divergent strategies of middle commanders after negotiated peace? After Colombia’s peace process with the insurgent group Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, former FARC midlevel commanders deployed a variety of strategies, from leading reintegration projects to build peace, to rearming splinter groups to spoil peace. Most other studies approach leading and spoiling separately, thus failing to account for both outcomes. Responding to this limitation, this article proposes an integrated theory explaining middle commander strategies after armed conflict. It argues that former commanders seek to maximise personal security and influence, and they choose strategies that respond to variations in local security and community embeddedness. Former commanders in secure areas with community embeddedness will build peace, while former commanders in dangerous areas with community embeddedness will spoil peace. This argument is evaluated with a qualitative analysis using primary data collected during field work in Colombia, including 59 interviews with former FARC members.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 79-110 |
Number of pages | 32 |
Journal | Conflict, Security and Development |
Volume | 24 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2024 |
Keywords
- collective reintegration
- Colombia
- DDR
- FARC
- peacebuilding
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- Political Science and International Relations