TY - JOUR
T1 - Friendly Jamming in a MIMO Wiretap Interference Network
T2 - A Nonconvex Game Approach
AU - Siyari, Peyman
AU - Krunz, Marwan
AU - Nguyen, Diep N.
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was supported in part by the NSF under Grant 1409172 and Grant CNS-1513649, in part by the Army Research Office under Grant W911NF-13-1-0302, in part by the Qatar National Research Fund under Grant NPRP 8-052-2-029, and in part by the Australian Research Council Discovery Early Career Researcher Award DE150101092. An abridged version of this paper was presented at the IEEE GLOBECOM 2016.
Publisher Copyright:
© 1983-2012 IEEE.
PY - 2017/3
Y1 - 2017/3
N2 - We consider joint optimization of artificial noise (AN) and information signals in a MIMO wiretap interference network, wherein the transmission of each link may be overheard by several MIMO-capable eavesdroppers. Each information signal is accompanied with AN, generated by the same user to confuse nearby eavesdroppers. Using a noncooperative game, a distributed optimization mechanism is proposed to maximize the secrecy rate of each link. The decision variables here are the covariance matrices for the information signals and ANs. However, the nonconvexity of each link's optimization problem (i.e., best response) makes conventional convex games inapplicable, even to find whether a Nash equilibrium (NE) exists. To tackle this issue, we analyze the proposed game using a relaxed equilibrium concept, called quasi-NE (QNE). Under a constraint qualification condition for each player's problem, the set of QNEs includes the NE of the proposed game. We also derive the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the resulting QNE. It turns out that the uniqueness conditions are too restrictive, and do not always hold in typical network scenarios. Thus, the proposed game often has multiple QNEs, and convergence to a QNE is not always guaranteed. To overcome these issues, we modify the utility functions of the players by adding several specific terms to each utility function. The modified game converges to a QNE even when multiple QNEs exist. Furthermore, players have the ability to select a desired QNE that optimizes a given social objective (e.g., sum rate or secrecy sum rate). Depending on the chosen objective, the amount of signaling overhead as well as the performance of resulting QNE can be controlled. Simulations show that not only can we guarantee the convergence to a QNE, but also due to the QNE selection mechanism, we can achieve a significant improvement in terms of secrecy sum rate and power efficiency, especially in dense networks.
AB - We consider joint optimization of artificial noise (AN) and information signals in a MIMO wiretap interference network, wherein the transmission of each link may be overheard by several MIMO-capable eavesdroppers. Each information signal is accompanied with AN, generated by the same user to confuse nearby eavesdroppers. Using a noncooperative game, a distributed optimization mechanism is proposed to maximize the secrecy rate of each link. The decision variables here are the covariance matrices for the information signals and ANs. However, the nonconvexity of each link's optimization problem (i.e., best response) makes conventional convex games inapplicable, even to find whether a Nash equilibrium (NE) exists. To tackle this issue, we analyze the proposed game using a relaxed equilibrium concept, called quasi-NE (QNE). Under a constraint qualification condition for each player's problem, the set of QNEs includes the NE of the proposed game. We also derive the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the resulting QNE. It turns out that the uniqueness conditions are too restrictive, and do not always hold in typical network scenarios. Thus, the proposed game often has multiple QNEs, and convergence to a QNE is not always guaranteed. To overcome these issues, we modify the utility functions of the players by adding several specific terms to each utility function. The modified game converges to a QNE even when multiple QNEs exist. Furthermore, players have the ability to select a desired QNE that optimizes a given social objective (e.g., sum rate or secrecy sum rate). Depending on the chosen objective, the amount of signaling overhead as well as the performance of resulting QNE can be controlled. Simulations show that not only can we guarantee the convergence to a QNE, but also due to the QNE selection mechanism, we can achieve a significant improvement in terms of secrecy sum rate and power efficiency, especially in dense networks.
KW - MIMO
KW - NE selection
KW - Wiretap interference network
KW - friendly jamming
KW - nonconvex games
KW - quasi-Nash equilibrium
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U2 - 10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659580
DO - 10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659580
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85018901439
SN - 0733-8716
VL - 35
SP - 601
EP - 614
JO - IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
JF - IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
IS - 3
M1 - 7835213
ER -