Follow the leader: Local interactions with influence neighborhoods

Peter Vanderschraaf, J. Mc Kenzie Alexander

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

8 Scopus citations


We introduce a dynamic model for evolutionary games played on a network where strategy changes are correlated according to degree of influence between players. Unlike the notion of stochastic stability (Foster and Young, 1990), which assumes mutations are stochastically independent and identically distributed, our framework allows for the possibility that agents correlate their strategies with the strategies of those they trust, or those who have influence over them. We show that the dynamical properties of evolutionary games, where such influence neighborhoods appear, differ dramatically from those where all mutations are stochastically independent, and establish some elementary convergence results relevant for the evolution of social institutions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)86-113
Number of pages28
JournalPhilosophy of Science
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 2005
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • History
  • Philosophy
  • History and Philosophy of Science


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