Explicit factuality and comparative evidence

Shaun Nichols, Claudia Uller

Research output: Contribution to journalShort surveypeer-review


We argue that Dienes and Perner's (D and P's) proposal needs to specify independent criteria when a subject explicitly represents factuality. This task is complicated by the fact that people typically 'tacitly' believe that each of their beliefs is a fact. This problem does not arise for comparative evidence on monkeys, for they presumably lack the capacity to represent factuality explicitly. D and P suggest that explicit visual processing and declarative memory depend on explicit representations of factuality, whereas the analogous implicit processes do not require such representations. Many of the implicit/explicit findings are also found in monkeys, however, and D and P's account needs to explain this striking parallel.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)776-777
Number of pages2
JournalBehavioral and Brain Sciences
Issue number5
StatePublished - 1999

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Neuropsychology and Physiological Psychology
  • Physiology
  • Behavioral Neuroscience


Dive into the research topics of 'Explicit factuality and comparative evidence'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this