TY - JOUR
T1 - Experimentalism, destabilization and control in International Law
T2 - Afterword to Laurence Boisson de Chazournes' Foreword
AU - Puig, Sergio
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s), 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of EJIL Ltd. All rights reserved.
PY - 2017/12/31
Y1 - 2017/12/31
N2 - In this Afterword in response to the Foreword by Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, I argue that to address the challenges of coordination between the growing number of international courts and tribunals, the role of international judges is necessary but not sufficient. Overcoming the various obstacles requires not only clarifying rules and relationships (exante specification) but also adding mechanisms that effectively accommodate interests while limiting pitfalls and contributing to calibrating adjudicatory authority (ex-post control). Such additional tools may help to control the tribunals' ability to make and apply their decisions. They also can serve to relieve the international law processes from the pressures exerted by excessive legal 'experimentalism'. Among the most obvious of such tools emerging in international economic agreements are consolidation or joint decision-making provisions, stays and under-ride processes, interaction requirements or special delegation arrangements.
AB - In this Afterword in response to the Foreword by Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, I argue that to address the challenges of coordination between the growing number of international courts and tribunals, the role of international judges is necessary but not sufficient. Overcoming the various obstacles requires not only clarifying rules and relationships (exante specification) but also adding mechanisms that effectively accommodate interests while limiting pitfalls and contributing to calibrating adjudicatory authority (ex-post control). Such additional tools may help to control the tribunals' ability to make and apply their decisions. They also can serve to relieve the international law processes from the pressures exerted by excessive legal 'experimentalism'. Among the most obvious of such tools emerging in international economic agreements are consolidation or joint decision-making provisions, stays and under-ride processes, interaction requirements or special delegation arrangements.
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U2 - 10.1093/ejil/chx082
DO - 10.1093/ejil/chx082
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85042943310
SN - 0938-5428
VL - 28
SP - 1267
EP - 1273
JO - European Journal of International Law
JF - European Journal of International Law
IS - 4
ER -