Experimental evidence of differential auditor pricing and reporting strategies

Michael J. Calegari, Jeffrey W. Schatzberg, Galen R. Sevcik

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

36 Scopus citations


This study tests the competitive equilibrium predictions of a multi-period model of audit pricing and independence in two sets of laboratory markets: a control set consisting of human subjects in the role of auditors contracting with robot clients, and a treatment set in which both auditors and clients are human subjects. The results in all the control-set markets and some of the treatment markets support the predictions of "lowball" pricing and that heterogeneous beliefs among auditors regarding the treatment of a client-reporting issue is a necessary condition for independence impairment. By contrast, several treatment-set markets exhibit cooperative behavior between auditors and clients to achieve jointly beneficial outcomes. This behavior deviates from the price-independence relationship predicted in the competitive equilibrium, exhibiting instead a price-independence relationship that is characterized by an absence of lowballing and frequent independence impairment, even when auditors have homogeneous beliefs.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)255-275
Number of pages21
JournalAccounting Review
Issue number2
StatePublished - Apr 1998


  • Auditing
  • Competitive equilibrium
  • Cooperation
  • Independence
  • Pricing
  • Signaling

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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