Abstract
An English clock auction and a sealed-bid auction with lowest accepted-bid pricing are studied in a controlled laboratory setting. Buyers bid for either a single unit or two units of the good. The sealed-bid auction generates more revenue than the English clock auction in both cases. The revenue from the English clock auction is lower in the two-unit demand environment than in the single-unit demand environment, due to strategic demand reduction on the part of bidders. (JEL C92, D44).
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 87-97 |
Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | Economic Inquiry |
Volume | 36 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 1998 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Economics and Econometrics