Experimental comparisons of auctions under single- and multi-unit demand

Paul Alsemgeest; Charles Noussair; Mark Olson

doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01697.x

Experimental comparisons of auctions under single- and multi-unit demand

Paul Alsemgeest, Charles Noussair, Mark Olson

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

48 Scopus citations

Abstract

An English clock auction and a sealed-bid auction with lowest accepted-bid pricing are studied in a controlled laboratory setting. Buyers bid for either a single unit or two units of the good. The sealed-bid auction generates more revenue than the English clock auction in both cases. The revenue from the English clock auction is lower in the two-unit demand environment than in the single-unit demand environment, due to strategic demand reduction on the part of bidders. (JEL C92, D44).

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	87-97
Number of pages	11
Journal	Economic Inquiry
Volume	36
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01697.x
State	Published - Jan 1998
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Business, Management and Accounting(all)
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01697.x

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Experimental comparisons of auctions under single- and multi-unit demand

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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