Evolutionary stability in games of communication

Andreas Blume, Yong Gwan Kim, Joel Sobel

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

68 Scopus citations


This paper identifies evolutionarily stable outcomes in games in which one player has private information and the other takes a payoff-relevant action. The informed player can communicate at little cost. Outcomes satisfying a set-valued evolutionary stability condition must exist and be efficient in common-interest games. When there is a small cost associated with using each message the outcome preferred by the informed player is stable. The paper introduces a nonequilibrium, set-valued stability notion of entry resistant sets. For games with partial common interest, the no-communication outcome is never an element of an entry resistant set. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)547-575
Number of pages29
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number4
StatePublished - Oct 1993

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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