Abstract
This paper identifies evolutionarily stable outcomes in games in which one player has private information and the other takes a payoff-relevant action. The informed player can communicate at little cost. Outcomes satisfying a set-valued evolutionary stability condition must exist and be efficient in common-interest games. When there is a small cost associated with using each message the outcome preferred by the informed player is stable. The paper introduces a nonequilibrium, set-valued stability notion of entry resistant sets. For games with partial common interest, the no-communication outcome is never an element of an entry resistant set. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 547-575 |
Number of pages | 29 |
Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Volume | 5 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Oct 1993 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics