@article{209845cfbc3a49308b5614a3db2fde8c,
title = "Evolution of communication with partial common interest",
abstract = "We experimentally investigate communication in sender-receiver games with imperfect incentive alignment. We consider both a priori meaningless messages and messages with pre-established meanings. Under four canonical incentive conditions, we get communication outcomes. However, it is by no means a fait accompli. We observe significant deterioration and recoding of a priori meanings, sucker behavior by receivers, and focal point and initial condition effects. A conservative partial common interest (PCI) condition generally is a reliable, albeit coarse predictor of the form of communication. Equilibrium selection criteria sometimes improve on the PCI prediction but neither influentiality, ex ante efficiency, nor Farrell's neologism-proofness refinement is reliable across all games, and equilibria are not always obtained. Considering comparative statics, equilibrium selection criteria are helpful but imperfect predictors of how equilibrium frequencies respond to incentives, whereas the less ambitious PCI prediction is never rejected by the data. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92, D82.",
keywords = "Cheap talk, Communication, Evolution, Game theory, Incentive alignment, Information transmission, Learning, Meaning, Refinements",
author = "Andreas Blume and DeJong, {Douglas V.} and Kim, {Yong Gwan} and Sprinkle, {Geoffrey B.}",
note = "Funding Information: We experimentally investigate communication in sender-receiver games with imperfect incentive alignment. We consider both a priori meaningless messages and messages with pre-established meanings. Under four canonical incentive conditions, we get communication outcomes. However, it is by no means a fait accompli. We observe significant deterioration and recoding of a priori meanings, sucker behavior by receivers, and focal point and initial condition effects. A conservative partial common interest (PCI) condition generally is a reliable, albeit coarse predictor of the form of communication. Equilibrium selection criteria sometimes improve on the PCI prediction but neither inf luentiality, ex ante efficiency, 1We thank, without implicating, James Andreoni, John Kennan, Larry Samuelson, an anonymous associate editor, and an anonymous referee for their advice and suggestions. We are grateful for financial support from the Tippie Col l ege of Business at the University of Iowa, the Ira B. McGladrey Institute, and the National Science Foundation. We have benefited from comments by seminar participants at the London School of Economics, University of British Columbia, University of Amsterdam, CentER for Economic Research (Tilburg University), University of Wisconsin-Madison, University of Iowa, the ESA meetings in Long Beach, and the Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society.",
year = "2001",
doi = "10.1006/game.2000.0830",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "37",
pages = "79--120",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
number = "1",
}