ESOPs and corporate control

Lilli A. Gordon, John Pound

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

68 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper examines the effects of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) on shareholder wealth. ESOPs established in the presence of takeover activity reduce share values, by approximately 4% on average. ESOPs also reduce share values if they are structured to transfer control away from outside shareholders, by creating a new ownership block with veto power over takeover bids. Large ESOPs established with nonvoting stock, so as to preclude any immediate control transfers, result in a significant increase in share values. The wealth effect of any given ESOP thus depends upon both its incentive and control effects on the corporation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)525-555
Number of pages31
JournalJournal of Financial Economics
Volume27
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1990
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Strategy and Management

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