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Equilibrium refinements in sender-receiver games
Andreas Blume
Economics
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Article
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peer-review
12
Scopus citations
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Dive into the research topics of 'Equilibrium refinements in sender-receiver games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
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Business & Economics
Equilibrium Refinements
100%
Pooling Equilibrium
70%
Pure Strategy Equilibrium
22%
Separating Equilibrium
21%
Perturbation
18%
Persistence
15%
Economics
8%