Epistemic Values and Disinformation

Don Fallis

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

5 Scopus citations


David Hume (1748) famously said, “when anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened.” Of course, intentionally deceptive information on many topics (not just reports of miracles) can interfere with our ability to achieve our epistemic goals of acquiring true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs. Thus, it would be beneficial to reduce the spread of such disinformation. In order to do this, we need to identify what sorts of things affect the amount of disinformation and how they affect it. Toward this end, I offer an analysis of what disinformation is. I then use this analysis to develop a game-theoretic model (which is inspired by the work of Elliott Sober and of Brian Skyrms and which appeals to philosophical work on epistemic values) of the sending and receiving of disinformation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationSynthese Library
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media B.V.
Number of pages21
StatePublished - 2014
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameSynthese Library
ISSN (Print)0166-6991
ISSN (Electronic)2542-8292


  • Epistemic State
  • Equilibrium Point
  • Monarch Butterfly
  • Pure Strategy
  • True Belief

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • History and Philosophy of Science
  • History
  • Language and Linguistics
  • Logic


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