Empirical justification and defeasibility

Juan Comesaña

doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1865-x

Empirical justification and defeasibility

Juan Comesaña

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Two truisms about empirical justification are that experience plays a crucial role in it (hence the name) and that it is defeasible. There are, of course, different ways of developing these truisms into philosophical theories. I favor one particular view about the role of experience in empirical justification which may be thought to lead to problems in accommodating its defeasibility. My aim in this paper is to argue that the problems are illusory, based on an entrenched misconception how defeaters work.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1771-1786
Number of pages	16
Journal	Synthese
Volume	198
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1865-x
State	Published - Apr 2021

Keywords

Defeaters
Empirical justification
Experience

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Philosophy
General Social Sciences

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10.1007/s11229-018-1865-x

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AB - Two truisms about empirical justification are that experience plays a crucial role in it (hence the name) and that it is defeasible. There are, of course, different ways of developing these truisms into philosophical theories. I favor one particular view about the role of experience in empirical justification which may be thought to lead to problems in accommodating its defeasibility. My aim in this paper is to argue that the problems are illusory, based on an entrenched misconception how defeaters work.

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KW - Experience

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Empirical justification and defeasibility

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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