Abstract
The price of anarchy (PoA) is the efficiency loss of a system resulting from individual route choice behavior. Network traffic management is often aimed at moving the system from the user equilibrium (UE) state to the system optimum (SO) state, or to reduce the PoA. This, however, may have a negative impact on individual users. This paper examines the effect of reducing the PoA on individual users or user groups. We quantify the gains and losses of users or user groups and the room for improvement resulting from a change from the UE state to the SO state with a generalized cost function comparable to the BPR function. Properties of changes in flows and costs for alternative routes and their relationships to one another are derived. The implication of traffic control aimed at reducing the price of anarchy and at the same time ensuring fairness in highway resource allocation is discussed.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 1670-1692 |
Number of pages | 23 |
Journal | Transportmetrica B |
Volume | 7 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 23 2019 |
Keywords
- Traffic control
- resource allocation
- system optimum
- user equilibrium
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Software
- Modeling and Simulation
- Transportation