Doublemindedness: A model for a dual content cognitive architecture

Jenann Ismael

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


The outstanding stumbling blocks to any reductive account of phenomenal consciousness remain the subjectivity of phenomenal properties and cognitive and epistemic gaps that plague the relationship between physical and phenomenal properties. I suggest that a deflationary interpretation of both is available to defenders of self-representational accounts.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-11
Number of pages11
Issue number2
StatePublished - 2006


  • Cognitive gaps
  • Consciousness
  • Dual content
  • Presentation
  • Self-representation
  • Subjectivity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
  • Philosophy
  • Cognitive Neuroscience
  • Artificial Intelligence


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