Abstract
The outstanding stumbling blocks to any reductive account of phenomenal consciousness remain the subjectivity of phenomenal properties and cognitive and epistemic gaps that plague the relationship between physical and phenomenal properties. I suggest that a deflationary interpretation of both is available to defenders of self-representational accounts.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-11 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Journal | Psyche |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| State | Published - 2006 |
Keywords
- Cognitive gaps
- Consciousness
- Dual content
- Presentation
- Self-representation
- Subjectivity
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
- Philosophy
- Cognitive Neuroscience
- Artificial Intelligence