TY - JOUR
T1 - Dividing attention impairs metacognitive control more than monitoring
AU - Peng, Yaoping
AU - Tullis, Jonathan G.
N1 - Funding Information:
This research was supported in part by the Research and Project Grants from the Graduate and Professional Student Council of the University of Arizona.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, The Psychonomic Society, Inc.
PY - 2021/12
Y1 - 2021/12
N2 - Students consistently report multitasking (e.g., checking social media, texting, watching Netflix) when studying on their own (e.g., Junco & Cotton, Computers & Education, 59[2], 505–514, 2012). Multitasking impairs explicit learning (e.g., Carrier, Rosen, Cheever, & Lim, Developmental Review, 35, 64–78, 2015), but the impact of multitasking on metacognitive monitoring and control is less clear. Metacognition may compete with ongoing cognitive processing for mental resources (e.g., Nelson & Narens, The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 26, 125–141, 1990) and would be impaired by dividing attention; alternatively, metacognition may require little attention (e.g., Boekaerts & Niemivirta, Handbook of Self-Regulation [pp. 417–450], 2000) and would not be impacted by dividing attention. Across three experiments, we assessed the influence of divided attention on metacognition. Participants made item-by-item judgements of learning (JOLs) after studying word pairs under full or divided attention (Experiment 1) and made restudy choices (Experiments 2 & 3). Dividing attention had little impact on the resolution of learners’ metacognitive monitoring, but significantly impaired calibration of monitoring, the relationship between monitoring and control, and the efficacy of metacognitive control. The data suggest that monitoring may require few cognitive resources, but controlling one’s learning (e.g., planning what to restudy and implementing a plan) may demand significant mental resources.
AB - Students consistently report multitasking (e.g., checking social media, texting, watching Netflix) when studying on their own (e.g., Junco & Cotton, Computers & Education, 59[2], 505–514, 2012). Multitasking impairs explicit learning (e.g., Carrier, Rosen, Cheever, & Lim, Developmental Review, 35, 64–78, 2015), but the impact of multitasking on metacognitive monitoring and control is less clear. Metacognition may compete with ongoing cognitive processing for mental resources (e.g., Nelson & Narens, The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 26, 125–141, 1990) and would be impaired by dividing attention; alternatively, metacognition may require little attention (e.g., Boekaerts & Niemivirta, Handbook of Self-Regulation [pp. 417–450], 2000) and would not be impacted by dividing attention. Across three experiments, we assessed the influence of divided attention on metacognition. Participants made item-by-item judgements of learning (JOLs) after studying word pairs under full or divided attention (Experiment 1) and made restudy choices (Experiments 2 & 3). Dividing attention had little impact on the resolution of learners’ metacognitive monitoring, but significantly impaired calibration of monitoring, the relationship between monitoring and control, and the efficacy of metacognitive control. The data suggest that monitoring may require few cognitive resources, but controlling one’s learning (e.g., planning what to restudy and implementing a plan) may demand significant mental resources.
KW - Divided attention
KW - Metacognition
KW - Metacognitive control
KW - Metacognitive monitoring
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U2 - 10.3758/s13423-021-01950-9
DO - 10.3758/s13423-021-01950-9
M3 - Article
C2 - 34131889
AN - SCOPUS:85107939698
VL - 28
SP - 2064
EP - 2074
JO - Psychonomic Bulletin and Review
JF - Psychonomic Bulletin and Review
SN - 1069-9384
IS - 6
ER -