TY - JOUR
T1 - Disenabling levy's frankfurt-style enabling cases
AU - Haji, Ishtiyaque
AU - McKenna, Michael
PY - 2011/9
Y1 - 2011/9
N2 - Recently, Neil Levy has proposed that an agent can acquire freedom-relevant agential abilities by virtue of the conditions in which she finds herself, and in this way, can be thought of as partially constituted by those conditions. This can be so even if the agent is completely ignorant of the relevant environmental conditions, and even if these conditions play no causal role in what the agent does. Drawing upon these resources, Levy argues that Frankfurt-style examples are not cogent. In this paper, we explain why his argument fails.
AB - Recently, Neil Levy has proposed that an agent can acquire freedom-relevant agential abilities by virtue of the conditions in which she finds herself, and in this way, can be thought of as partially constituted by those conditions. This can be so even if the agent is completely ignorant of the relevant environmental conditions, and even if these conditions play no causal role in what the agent does. Drawing upon these resources, Levy argues that Frankfurt-style examples are not cogent. In this paper, we explain why his argument fails.
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U2 - 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01403.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01403.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:80052051944
SN - 0279-0750
VL - 92
SP - 400
EP - 414
JO - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
JF - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
IS - 3
ER -