Abstract
Information for forecasting databases is often initially under the control of individuals who have no compelling reason to contribute, and who face various significant costs if they do. Such discretionary databases are subject to public goods problems, and are likely to be undersupplied, even when all participants agree that the overall benefits outweigh the overall costs. This paper explores the implications of this incentive structure for the existence, completeness and accuracy of forecasting databases. It also offers some hypotheses as to when the difficulties will be more and less severe, and outlines some directions for possible remedial strategies.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-12 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | Journal of Forecasting |
| Volume | 9 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1990 |
Keywords
- Data quality
- Databases
- Forecasting
- Free riders
- Public goods
- Social dilemmas
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Modeling and Simulation
- Economics and Econometrics
- Computer Science Applications
- Strategy and Management
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
- Management Science and Operations Research