Discretionary databases as social dilemmas

The intent of this paper is to extend the analysis of social dilemmas (Dawes, 1980; Messick & Brewer, 1983) to include certain classes of multiperson information sharing and decision making processes. The processes of interest are those in which each of several motivationally myopic individuals initially holds information that has decision relevance to at least some of the others, and has access to some medium of publication (a “database”) which would make the information available to the interested users. If a cost (such as money, effort, delay, potential embarrassment, or loss of strategic advantage) is associated with such publication, the incentive structure may take on the character of a “public goods” or “commons” problem: The individually dominant strategy, regardless of the choices of others, is to withhold one’s information; the aggregate of such choices is the individually less-preferred, socially deficient equilibrium in which no information is contributed.