Designing Dynamic Subsidies to Spur Adoption of New Technologies

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

10 Scopus citations

Abstract

We analyze the efficient subsidy for durable good technologies. We the-oretically demonstrate that a policy maker faces a tension between intertemporally price discriminating by designing a subsidy that increases over time and taking advan-tage of future technological progress by designing a subsidy that decreases over time. Using dynamic estimates of household preferences for residential solar in California, we show that the efficient subsidy increases over time. The regulator’s spending quin-tuples when households anticipate future technological progress and future subsidies.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1197-1234
Number of pages38
JournalJournal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists
Volume9
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2022

Keywords

  • durable good
  • dynamics
  • expectations
  • foresight
  • price discrimination
  • solar
  • subsidy
  • technological change

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Nature and Landscape Conservation
  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Designing Dynamic Subsidies to Spur Adoption of New Technologies'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this