Abstract
Better investor protection could lead corporations to undertake riskier but value-enhancing investments. For example, better investor protection mitigates the taking of private benefits leading to excess risk-avoidance. Further, in better investor protection environments, stakeholders like creditors, labor groups, and the government are less effective in reducing corporate risk-taking for their self-interest. However, arguments can also be made for a negative relationship between investor protection and risk-taking. Using a cross-country panel and a U.S.-only sample, we find that corporate risk-taking and firm growth rates are positively related to the quality of investor protection.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 1679-1728 |
Number of pages | 50 |
Journal | Journal of Finance |
Volume | 63 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Aug 2008 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Accounting
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics