@article{ba412959c6154709b80810dd44172d75,
title = "Consistency and communication in committees",
abstract = "We generalize the classical binary Condorcet jury model by introducing a richer state and signal space, thereby generating a concern for consistency in the evaluation of aggregate information. We analyze truth-telling incentives in simultaneous pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees and find that full pooling of information followed by sincere voting is compatible with a positive probability of ex post conflict in the committee.",
keywords = "Cheap talk, Committees, Information aggregation, Voting",
author = "Inga Deimen and Felix Ketelaar and {Le Quement}, {Mark T.}",
note = "Funding Information: We thank D. Szalay for his insightful comments and support. We are grateful to P. Es{\"o}, L. Felli, D. Kr{\"a}hmer, and M. Meyer-Ter-Vehn for helpful comments. This version has benefited from comments and suggestions from the editor, the co-editor and two anonymous referees. The paper has also benefited from comments made by the following audiences: SFB meeting Spring 2012, Spring Meeting of Young Economists 2012, Bonn Micro Workshop, 11th meeting of the Society of Social Choice and Welfare, EEA-ESEM Congress 2012, Verein f{\"u}r Socialpolitik Jahrestagung 2012, TU Dortmund Volkswirtschaftliches Kolloquium, EDP Jamboree 2012, EPC Meeting 2013, Konstanz Doctoral Seminar in Public Economics. Financial support from the Institute of Microeconomics, University of Bonn , the BGSE , and the German Science Foundation ( DFG ) through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2015 Elsevier Inc.",
year = "2015",
month = dec,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.004",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "160",
pages = "24--35",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
}