Composable Template Attacks Using Templates for Individual Architectural Components

Bozhi Liu, Roman L Lysecky, Janet Meiling Wang-Roveda

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

With embedded systems and IoT devices being widely deployed nowadays, their security becomes a major concern. Among all possible attacks, side channel attacks (SCA) represent a major source of threats. For power side channels, template attacks have been proven to be efficient and widely applicable. Traditional template attacks require physical access to an identical target device for extensive profiling to construct the attack template. In this paper, we present a composable template attack that relaxes this requirement by constructing the attack template as a composition of templates from individual architectural components, including processor, caches, and memories. The proposed approach enables an attacker to construct a template using only information of a system's components and device models thereof.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2018 IEEE 36th International Conference on Computer Design, ICCD 2018
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages1-8
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)9781538684771
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 16 2019
Event36th International Conference on Computer Design, ICCD 2018 - Orlando, United States
Duration: Oct 7 2018Oct 10 2018

Publication series

NameProceedings - 2018 IEEE 36th International Conference on Computer Design, ICCD 2018

Conference

Conference36th International Conference on Computer Design, ICCD 2018
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityOrlando
Period10/7/1810/10/18

Keywords

  • Composable template attack
  • Embedded system security
  • Side channel analysis
  • Template attack

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Composable Template Attacks Using Templates for Individual Architectural Components'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this