Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

26 Scopus citations


This paper uses curb sets to study the evolution of effective pre-play communication in games where a single communication round precedes a simultaneous-move, complete-information game. It is shown that the effectiveness of one-sided pre-play communication is inversely related to risk in the underlying game, and to the size of the message space. If messages have somea prioriinformation content, then multi-sided communication is more effective than one-sided communication; i.e., risk and the size of the message space play no role.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)171-202
Number of pages32
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number2
StatePublished - Feb 1998

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this