TY - JOUR
T1 - Communication-proof equilibria in cheap-talk games
AU - Blume, Andreas
AU - Sobel, Joel
PY - 1995/4
Y1 - 1995/4
N2 - We define communication-proof equilibria in simple games of communication. These equilibria satisfy a stability condition guaranteeing that they would not be affected if new opportunities to communicate arose. We look for partitions of possible equilibria into sets of good and bad equilibria. The good equilibria are those that cannot be destabilized by another good equilibrium. The remaining equilibria are bad. An equilibrium for the original game is communication proof if its is a good equilibrium in a partition of this form. We prove that communication-proof equilibria exist and, for a class of common-interest games, communication-proof outcomes are efficient. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D80.
AB - We define communication-proof equilibria in simple games of communication. These equilibria satisfy a stability condition guaranteeing that they would not be affected if new opportunities to communicate arose. We look for partitions of possible equilibria into sets of good and bad equilibria. The good equilibria are those that cannot be destabilized by another good equilibrium. The remaining equilibria are bad. An equilibrium for the original game is communication proof if its is a good equilibrium in a partition of this form. We prove that communication-proof equilibria exist and, for a class of common-interest games, communication-proof outcomes are efficient. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D80.
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U2 - 10.1006/jeth.1995.1013
DO - 10.1006/jeth.1995.1013
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0000747491
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 65
SP - 359
EP - 382
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 2
ER -