Commentary on “contingent protection rules in regional trade agreements”

The Prusa/Teh study is a very useful and thorough analysis of a complex topic, one that will be helpful to those of us who research and write about trade remedies and regional trade agreements (RTAs). There is little in the analysis or the conclusions with which I disagree. Consequently, in these comments I offer a few observations that may complement Professor Prusa and Mr. Teh's work. Part I of this discussion focuses on the context (RTAs whose parties are also WTO members subject to WTO disciplines affecting the use of trade remedies). Part II focuses on Chapter 19 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), certainly the most important RTA after the EU given the huge volume of NAFTA trade, the relatively large number of intra-NAFTA trade actions, and the uniqueness of the Chapter 19 mechanism for appeals of national administrative agency decisions in AD and CVD unfair trade proceedings. Chapter 19 remains the most extensive (and widely used) mechanism relating to resolution of unfair trade actions among RTA partners, except the mechanisms available within the EU to deal with such issues (primarily related to anti-competitive practices). Part III offers observations on specific sections of the chapter. A few caveats are appropriate. As a noneconomist, I am more comfortable with discussing the legal and administrative processes and the external factors (primarily political) that affect efforts by RTAs to deal with trade remedy issues than the economic effects.