Collective epistemic goals

Don Fallis

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

27 Scopus citations


We all pursue epistemic goals as individuals. But we also pursue collective epistemic goals. In the case of many groups to which we belong, we want each member of the group - and sometimes even the group itself - to have as many true beliefs as possible and as few false beliefs as possible. In this paper, I respond to the main objections to the very idea of such collective epistemic goals. Furthermore, I describe the various ways that our collective epistemic goals can come into conflict with each other. And I argue that we must appeal to pragmatic considerations in order to resolve such conflicts.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)267-280
Number of pages14
JournalSocial Epistemology
Issue number3
StatePublished - Jul 2007


  • Collectives
  • Distribution of Knowledge
  • Epistemic Goals
  • Group Belief

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • General Social Sciences


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