TY - JOUR
T1 - Cognitive Networks with In-Band Full-Duplex Radios
T2 - Jamming Attacks and Countermeasures
AU - Hanawal, Manjesh K.
AU - Nguyen, Diep N.
AU - Krunz, Marwan
N1 - Funding Information:
Manuscript received October 18, 2018; revised March 28, 2019 and June 30, 2019; accepted July 27, 2019. Date of publication August 7, 2019; date of current version March 6, 2020. Manjesh K. Hanawal would like to thank support from INSPIRE faculty fellowships from DST, Government of India, SEED grant (16IRCCSG010) from IIT Bombay, and Early Careers Research Award (ECRA) from SERB. Diep N. Nguyen was supported by Australian Research Council (Discovery Early Career Researcher Award DE150101092). Marwan Krunz was supported in part by NSF (grants CNS-1409172, CNS-1513649, CNS-1563655, CNS-1731164, and IIP-1822071) and by the Broadband Wireless Access & Applications Center (BWAC). Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of NSF. An abridged version of this paper was presented at the IEEE INFOCOM Conference, May, 2016 [1]. The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving it for publication was K. P. Subbalakshmi. (Corresponding author: Diep N. Nguyen.) M. K. Hanawal is with the IEOR, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai 400076, India (e-mail: [email protected]).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 IEEE.
PY - 2020/3
Y1 - 2020/3
N2 - Although in-band full-duplex (IBFD) radios promise to double the throughput of a wireless link, they are more vulnerable to jamming attacks than their out-of-band full-duplex (OBFD) counterparts. For two communicating OBFD nodes, a jammer needs to attack both the uplink and the downlink channels to completely break the communication link. In contrast, only one common channel needs to be jammed in the case of two IBFD nodes. Even worse, a jammer with self-interference suppression (SIS) capabilities (the underlying technique of IBFD radios) can learn the transmitters' activity while injecting interference, allowing it to react instantly to the transmitter's strategies. In this work, we consider a power-constrained IBFD 'reactive-sweep' jammer that sweeps through the set of channels by jamming a subset of them simultaneously. We model the interactions between the IBFD radios and the jammer as a stochastic constrained zero-sum Markov game in which nodes adopt the frequency hopping (FH) technique as their strategies to counter jamming attacks. Beside the IBFD transmission-reception (TR) mode, we introduce an additional operation mode, called transmission-detection (TD), in which an IBFD radio transmits and leverages its SIS capability to detect jammers. The aim of the TD mode is to make IBFD radios more cognitive to jamming. The nodes' optimal defense strategy that guides them when to hop and which operational mode (TD or TR) to use is then established from the equilibrium of the stochastic Markov game. We prove that this optimal policy has a threshold structure, in which IBFD nodes stay on the same channel up to a certain number of time slots before hopping. Simulation results show that our policy significantly improves the throughput of IBFD nodes under jamming attacks.
AB - Although in-band full-duplex (IBFD) radios promise to double the throughput of a wireless link, they are more vulnerable to jamming attacks than their out-of-band full-duplex (OBFD) counterparts. For two communicating OBFD nodes, a jammer needs to attack both the uplink and the downlink channels to completely break the communication link. In contrast, only one common channel needs to be jammed in the case of two IBFD nodes. Even worse, a jammer with self-interference suppression (SIS) capabilities (the underlying technique of IBFD radios) can learn the transmitters' activity while injecting interference, allowing it to react instantly to the transmitter's strategies. In this work, we consider a power-constrained IBFD 'reactive-sweep' jammer that sweeps through the set of channels by jamming a subset of them simultaneously. We model the interactions between the IBFD radios and the jammer as a stochastic constrained zero-sum Markov game in which nodes adopt the frequency hopping (FH) technique as their strategies to counter jamming attacks. Beside the IBFD transmission-reception (TR) mode, we introduce an additional operation mode, called transmission-detection (TD), in which an IBFD radio transmits and leverages its SIS capability to detect jammers. The aim of the TD mode is to make IBFD radios more cognitive to jamming. The nodes' optimal defense strategy that guides them when to hop and which operational mode (TD or TR) to use is then established from the equilibrium of the stochastic Markov game. We prove that this optimal policy has a threshold structure, in which IBFD nodes stay on the same channel up to a certain number of time slots before hopping. Simulation results show that our policy significantly improves the throughput of IBFD nodes under jamming attacks.
KW - Jamming attack
KW - Markov games
KW - dynamic frequency hopping
KW - in-band full-duplex radio
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85070696634&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1109/TCCN.2019.2933816
DO - 10.1109/TCCN.2019.2933816
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85070696634
SN - 2332-7731
VL - 6
SP - 296
EP - 309
JO - IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking
JF - IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking
IS - 1
M1 - 8790787
ER -