TY - GEN
T1 - Characterizing Encrypted Application Traffic Through Cellular Radio Interface Protocol
AU - Islam, Md Ruman
AU - Anwar, Raja Hasnain
AU - Mastorakis, Spyridon
AU - Raza, Muhammad Taqi
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 IEEE.
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - Modern applications are end-to-end encrypted to prevent data from being read or secretly modified. 5G technology provides ubiquitous access to these applications without compromising the application-specific performance and latency goals. In this paper, we empirically demonstrate that 5G radio communication becomes the side channel to precisely infer the user's applications in real-time. The key idea lies in observing the 5G physical and MAC layer interactions over time that reveal the application's behavior. The MAC layer receives the data from the application and requests the network to assign the radio resource blocks. The network assigns the radio resources as per application requirements, such as priority, Quality of Service (QoS) needs, amount of data to be transmitted, and buffer size. The adversary can passively observe the radio resources to fingerprint the applications. We empirically demonstrate this attack by considering four different categories of applications: online shopping, voice/video conferencing, video streaming, and Over-The- Top (OTT) media platforms. Finally, we have also demonstrated that an attacker can differentiate various types of applications in real-time within each category.
AB - Modern applications are end-to-end encrypted to prevent data from being read or secretly modified. 5G technology provides ubiquitous access to these applications without compromising the application-specific performance and latency goals. In this paper, we empirically demonstrate that 5G radio communication becomes the side channel to precisely infer the user's applications in real-time. The key idea lies in observing the 5G physical and MAC layer interactions over time that reveal the application's behavior. The MAC layer receives the data from the application and requests the network to assign the radio resource blocks. The network assigns the radio resources as per application requirements, such as priority, Quality of Service (QoS) needs, amount of data to be transmitted, and buffer size. The adversary can passively observe the radio resources to fingerprint the applications. We empirically demonstrate this attack by considering four different categories of applications: online shopping, voice/video conferencing, video streaming, and Over-The- Top (OTT) media platforms. Finally, we have also demonstrated that an attacker can differentiate various types of applications in real-time within each category.
KW - Mobile and wireless security
KW - Mobile networks
KW - Security and privacy
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85210232463&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85210232463&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/MASS62177.2024.00050
DO - 10.1109/MASS62177.2024.00050
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85210232463
T3 - Proceedings - 2024 IEEE 21st International Conference on Mobile Ad-Hoc and Smart Systems, MASS 2024
SP - 321
EP - 329
BT - Proceedings - 2024 IEEE 21st International Conference on Mobile Ad-Hoc and Smart Systems, MASS 2024
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 21st IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad-Hoc and Smart Systems, MASS 2024
Y2 - 23 September 2024 through 25 September 2024
ER -