TY - JOUR
T1 - Causes of Foreign-Imposed Regime Change
T2 - The Signal of Economic Expropriation
AU - Villa, Danielle
AU - Arnon, Daniel
AU - Reiter, Dan
N1 - Funding Information:
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Charles W. Koch Foundation
Funding Information:
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2020 annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, to the UCLA political science department, and to the Emory International Relations Journal Club. For very helpful feedback, our great thanks to Meir Alkon, Alexander Downes, Benjamin Fordham, Koji Kagotani, and Melissa Willard Foster. The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Charles W. Koch Foundation
Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2022.
PY - 2022/5
Y1 - 2022/5
N2 - Why do major powers attempt foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC)? This article builds on existing security theory, proposing that a major power looks for signals that a government might exit that major power’s international hierarchy and/or enter an adversary’s hierarchy. Major powers are more likely to attempt FIRC against states that signal shifting preferences. The article tests the theory on American FIRC attempts from 1947 to 1989, covert and overt, failed and successful, proposing that when a hierarchy member or neutral state engaged in economic expropriation, this signaled possible exit from the US hierarchy and/or entry into the Soviet hierarchy, making a US FIRC attempt against that state more likely. It also presents an alternative theory, that economic special interests drove US FIRC attempts. Using new data on expropriations, the article supports the security theory, as expropriations by US hierarchy members made FIRC attempts more likely, but does not support the special interests theory.
AB - Why do major powers attempt foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC)? This article builds on existing security theory, proposing that a major power looks for signals that a government might exit that major power’s international hierarchy and/or enter an adversary’s hierarchy. Major powers are more likely to attempt FIRC against states that signal shifting preferences. The article tests the theory on American FIRC attempts from 1947 to 1989, covert and overt, failed and successful, proposing that when a hierarchy member or neutral state engaged in economic expropriation, this signaled possible exit from the US hierarchy and/or entry into the Soviet hierarchy, making a US FIRC attempt against that state more likely. It also presents an alternative theory, that economic special interests drove US FIRC attempts. Using new data on expropriations, the article supports the security theory, as expropriations by US hierarchy members made FIRC attempts more likely, but does not support the special interests theory.
KW - conflict
KW - foreign imposed regime change
KW - interstate conflict
KW - intervention
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U2 - 10.1177/00220027211070604
DO - 10.1177/00220027211070604
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85126000135
VL - 66
SP - 651
EP - 676
JO - Journal of Conflict Resolution
JF - Journal of Conflict Resolution
SN - 0022-0027
IS - 4-5
ER -