Blowing the whistle

Jose Apesteguia; Martin Dufwenberg; Reinhard Selten

doi:10.1007/s00199-006-0092-8

Blowing the whistle

Jose Apesteguia, Martin Dufwenberg, Reinhard Selten

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

88 Scopus citations

Abstract

Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, experimentally.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	143-166
Number of pages	24
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	31
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0092-8
State	Published - Apr 2007

Keywords

Amnesty
Anti-trust
Bertrand model
Blow the whistle
Cartels
Experiment communication
Immunity
Leniency
Price competition

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1007/s00199-006-0092-8

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AB - Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, experimentally.

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KW - Price competition

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Blowing the whistle

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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