Blowing the whistle

Jose Apesteguia, Martin Dufwenberg, Reinhard Selten

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

84 Scopus citations


Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, experimentally.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)143-166
Number of pages24
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - Apr 2007


  • Amnesty
  • Anti-trust
  • Bertrand model
  • Blow the whistle
  • Cartels
  • Experiment communication
  • Immunity
  • Leniency
  • Price competition

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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